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THE EUROPEAN BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
FIRST DECADE OF INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTSt
A. Luini del Russo*
The rights of individuals and the justice due to them are as dear and
precious as those of States. Indeed the latter are founded upon the
former; and the great end and object of them must be, to secure and
support the rights of individuals, or else, vain is government.
Justice Cushing in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 468 (1793)
INTRODUCTION
The history of events leading to the Second World War reveals
one of the most alarming aspects of our times, the ease with which
allegedly civilized governments imperceptibly succeeded in stripping
human beings of all subjective rights and finally of life. This they
achieved primarily by doing away with the very idea that man could
possess any imprescriptible rights not granted to him by the supreme
arbitrary authority of the state.
In contrast to this concept of unlimited sovereignty, the world
community reaffirmed through the United Nations Charter and the
Nuremberg trials "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity
and worth of the human person"' and acceptance of the principle
that the individual is a subject of international rights and duties to
t Research preliminary to this paper and personal consultations with Human
Rights experts were made possible through a Howard University Faculty Research
Grant. The author is also deeply indebted to the Honorable G. Baliadore-Pallieri and
H. Rolin, Judges of the European Court of Human Rights [hereinafter referred to
as the Court], to Messrs. Fawcett, Sperduti and other members of the European
Commission on Human Rights [hereinafter referred to as the Commission] and in
particular to Mr. A. B. McNulty, Secretary to the Commission, and Mr. H. Golsong,
Registrar of the Court, for the time and expertise they put at her disposal during her
stay in Europe in July-August 1963.
For a complete current bibliography on the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [hereinafter referred to as the Convention] see
the YEARBOOK OF T E3 EUROPEAN CONvENTIoN ON HUmAN RIoHTS [hereinafter cited
as the Yr.RBOOX], vols. 1-4, Nijhoff, The Hague (1955-1961).
* Degree Diplomatics, Royal School Paleography and Diplomatics, Milan, Italy,
1937; Ph.D., Royal University, Milan, 1939; Jur. D., Royal University, Pavia, 1943;
Master of Comparative Law, The George Washington University, 1949; Member,
United States Supreme Court, District of Columbia, and Maryland Bars. Associate
Professor of Law, Howard University.
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be recognized in international law. In the European Convention on
Human Rights, fifteen countries gave legal sanction to such recog-
nition, establishing in a solemn, binding form a guarantee of collec-
tive enforcement of human rights at the international level as a
means of preserving world peace. In the words of Mr. Elwyn Jones
before the House of Commons:
As a result of these and other developments in international law, the
individual human person now everywhere has acquired a new status
and stature, whether he is a man of the Clapham omnibus, a detainee in
Nyasaland, a prisoner in the Hola camp, a political prisoner in Spain or
a political prisoner in Hungary. To use the eloquent phrase of Sir
Hersch Lauterpacht, .. . "the individual has been transformed from an
object of international compassion into a subject of international
right." 2
CORNERSTONE OF EUROPEAN UNITY
The Convention, first treaty entered into by the united states
of Europe, came into existence ten years ago.' It signified to the
West and to the East that the European union was built on the prin-
ciple of "the maintenance and further realization of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms ... which are the foundation of justice
and peace in the world .... ."
The objectives pursued by the Convention are indeed predomi-
nantly of a political nature.5 As early as September 1949, in the
2 House of Commons, Weekly Hansard, No. 462, June 25, 1959, col. 1546-47.
3 The Convention was signed in Rome on November 4, 1950, by all of the Mem-
ber States of the Council of Europe; it came into force on September 3, 1953, upon
ratification by the tenth State, Luxembourg. 1 YEARBooK 96, 102 (1955). It is now
binding upon fifteen European countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, The
German Federal Republic, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Nether-
lands, Norway, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
4 Preamble to the Convention, 1 YEARBooK 4 (1955). The language of the Pre-
amble is directly derived in form and substance from the Statute of the Council of
Europe signed in London on May 5, 1949, which provided under Article 3: "Every
Member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and
of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms. .. 2" 1 YEARBOOx 2 (1955). Commenting on Article 3 of the Statute,
the French Delegate to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, M. Teit-
gen, stated on August 19, 1949, during a general debate on the drafting of a Conven-
tion on Human Rights: "This fundamental affirmation is thus inscribed at the very
foundation of our union.... All the States that have taken part in drawing up, sign-
ing and promulgating our Statute have bound themselves to respect the fundamental
rights of the human individual. They have accepted the principle of a collective
guarantee of fundamental freedoms." CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY REPORTS, 1st Sess.
404 (1949).
On the close relationship between the Convention and the Statute of the Council
of Europe, see also Modinos, La Convention europlenne des droits de 'homme, 1
EUROPEAN YEARBOOK 141 (1955).
5 The Preamble to the Convention considers that the aim of the Council of
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course of debates before the Consultative Assembly of the Council
of Europe, Lord Layton commented thus on the draft Convention:
What we are proposing to do by this first specific act of the Council of
Europe ... is to define and guarantee the political basis of this associa-
tion of European nations. What the members of this association are say-
ing, if this proposal materialises, is that the maintenance of certain
basic democratic rights in any one of our countries is not the concern
of that country alone but is the concern of the whole group. Therefore
we propose that if a complaint is made that this minimum standard is
not in fact being realised, the country concerned will, subject to proper
safeguards which are set out here in this Declaration, permit the com-
plaint to be submitted to impartial inquiry and if necessary to the
judgment of the European Tribunal.6
And M. Teitgen, the French Rapporteur, added on that same oc-
casion:
When we wish to guarantee and protect the freedoms of Europe it does
not mean diminishing the sovereignty of one State in relation to an-
other State or giving predominance to one State over another. It is a
question of limiting State sovereignty on behalf of the law and for that
purpose all restrictions are permitted.7
A LEGALLY BINDING INSTRUMENT
The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights8 had pro-
claimed to the world in 1948 the universal nature of human rights
for all men, at all times, in all countries. It was an inspiring act of
faith, a "statement of general principles . . . of the highest moral
authority."9 It was not a legal instrument binding upon the adopt-
ing states; it could not "strictly speaking, be said to constitute part
of international law or of any municipal law.' 01
Europe is the achievement of greater unity between its Members and that one of the
methods by which that aim is to be pursued is the maintenance and further realization
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 1 YEARBOOK 2 (1955).
See on this point Vasak, Cour et Commission des droits de l'homme, JURS-
CLASSEUR DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, Fasc. 155F, 1, 4 (1961).6 CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY REPORTS, 1st Sess. 118 (1949).
7 Id. at 1160.
8 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, December 10, 1948; U.N.
GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 3d Sess. (I), resolutions at 71 (A-810) (1948).
9 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: a Standard of Achievement, U.N.
PUBL. No. 62.1.9, at 13.
10 Ibid. See also Castanos and Sidjanski, La Convention europJenne des droits
de l'homme, JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 580 (1955). Heumann, Les droits
garantis par la Convention, in LA PROTECTION INTERNATIONALE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
DANS LE CADRE EUROP]EN 145 (1961); Tammes, The Obligation to Provide Local
Remedies in VOLKENRECHLIJXE OPSTELLEN 152, 158 (1962). In Sei Fujii v. California,
217 P.2d 481, 488 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal. 1950), the California District Court of Appeal
found invalid the State Alien Land Law in direct conflict with the United Nations
Charter "which, as a treaty, is paramount to every law of every state in conflict with
it," and incompatible with the Declaration of Human Rights which it defined as a
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The Preamble to the European Convention acknowledges its
two main ideological sources, the Universal Declaration and the
Statute of the Council of Europe. But in the Convention each mem-
ber state assumed a formal international law obligation" by con-
senting to the creation of a system of collective enforcement of
Human Rights at the international level, surrendering for that pur-
pose such traditional strongholds of state sovereignty as the unlimited
and exclusive power to control the rights of individuals within its
own boundaries.'" This legal instrument expresses the determination
of fifteen states to submit to a common discipline and a mutual con-
trol in the interest of effectively ensuring the respect of individual
freedoms.
document that "implements and emphasizes the purposes and aims of the United
Nations and its charter." The California Supreme Court, however, 38 Cal. 2d 718,
242 P.2d 617 (1952), without any reference to the Universal Declaration, reversed
the decision of the court below on the ground that the provisions of the United Na-
tions Charter are not self-executing, so that the treaty could not automatically super-
sede state legislation. It found instead the statute invalid as in conflict with the Four-
teenth Amendment.
In France the Universal Declaration was published on January 9, 1949, in the
JOURNAL OFFICIEL (p. 1859) where all legislation and ratified treaties are entered,
giving it, thus, a closer similarity to international conventions. But see JOURNAL OF-
FICEL, Debats Parlementaires, Assembile Nationale, p. 1171 (1952). A conflicting inter-
pretation was given by the French courts to the legal implications of such procedure.
The Court of Paris interpreted such publication as sufficient to give the Declaration
the same status of "a law of the French State" to be directly enforced by the French
courts. 1st Chamber, April 29, 1959 [1959] Gazette du Palais; May 23, 1959 REvUE
Du DROIT PUBLIQUE 820 (1959). Conversely, the highest administrative tribunal, the
Conseil d'Etat, in two separate decisions, in 1951 and in 1960, rejected the contention
that the mere publication of the Declaration in the JOURnAL OFFICIEL could give it
rank and dignity equal to ratified international treaties. Elections de Nolay, April 18,
1951, and Sieur Car, May 11, 1960, JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 404 (1961).
See also Pinto, LES ORcANISATIONS EUROPiENNES 81 (Paris 1963).
The Town Court of Reykiavik, Iceland, on June 28, 1960, dismissed the com-
plaint of Arni Olafson which challenged the validity of a 1957 Icelandic law taxing
large property, as contrary to the European Convention and to the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, on the following grounds: "It is true that the United Nations
Declaration of Human Rights has been published in the country in the periodical
'Andvari' but it cannot be seen that it has received any ratification here. For that
reason alone it cannot be taken into consideration as Plaintiff's legal basis in this tax
action of his.
"Insofar as the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms is concerned, Althing has by a parliamentary resolution of
19th December 1952 granted authority to the government to become a party to it,
and on the part of Iceland a document of ratification was delivered on the 29th of
July 1953. On the other hand, this Convention has not been legalized in this country,
neither as general law nor as constitutional law." 3 YARBOOK 642, 646 (1960).
11 VERDROSS, V6LKERRECHT 498ff. (1959).
12 In deciding application No. 434/58, the Commission stated on June 30, 1959:
. a State which signs and ratifies the European Convention . . . must be under-
stood as agreeing to restrict the free exercise of its rights under general international
law . . . to the extent and within the limits of the obligations which it has accepted
under the Convention; . . ." 2 YEARBOOK 354, 372 (1958-59).
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The European Convention introduced into the Law of Nations
the novel principle that the legal protection of human rights could
no longer be left to the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of states. It
started from the premise that not only nationals of the High Con-
tracting Parties but every person subject to their jurisdiction," citi-
zen, alien or stateless, was to be guaranteed the peaceful enjoyment
of his fundamental freedoms without discrimination by reason of
sex, race, religion, or national and social origin. 4
EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL
Upon this structural foundation the Convention established a
threefold system of collective guarantees of those rights under the
international control of two supra-national organs,'15 the European
Commission and the European Court of Human Rights.
The first obligation assumed by the fifteen ratifying states en-
tails the effective implementation of the provisions of the Conven-
tion within their domestic systems of law.'" It includes the duty to
13 Art. 1. "The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention." (Em-
phasis added.)
In its decision of January 11, 1961, as to the admissibility of Application No.
788/60 (Austria v. Italy), the Commission stated, ". .. the system of international
protection provided in the Convention extends to the nationals of the State which is
alleged to have violated the law of the Convention and to stateless persons, as well
as to nationals of other States; . . . fit] is founded upon the concept of a collective
guarantee of the rights and freedoms contained in the Convention. . . ." 4 YEARBOOK
116, 148-150 (1961).
14 Art. 14. "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Conven-
tion shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with
a national minority, property, birth or other status."
15 Art. 19. "To ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High
Contracting Parties in the Present Convention, there shall be set up: (1) A European
Commission of Human Rights... ; (2) A European Court of Human Rights...."16 The French text of Art. 1 (see supra note 13) uses only the term "reconnais-
sent" (Tr. ". . . the High Contracting Parties recognize . . .") as compared to "shall
secure" in the English text. Since both texts are authentic, they shall be read jointly
to establish the extent of the states' obligation. In addition, a study of the Preparatory
Works of the Convention discloses that in the course of the final debates in the
European Consultative Assembly on August 25, 1950, the word "reconnaissent" was
proposed by M. Henri Rolin, the distinguished Belgian delegate, now judge of the
European Court of Human Rights. It was adopted by the Assembly as an amendment
to the text of the Draft Convention which read, "s'engagent d reconnaitre" (Tr. "agree
to recognize"). CONsULTATIVE ASSEMBLY REPORTS, 2d Sess. 915 (1950). After the
Convention entered into force on Sept. 3, 1953, M. Rolin again stated at the 5th
Session of the Consultative Assembly: "According to Art. 1 . . . the States did not
'agree to recognize' in their legislation, they 'recognized': there is all the difference.
After this Convention is approved by our Parliaments and ratified, there follows that
without the passing of further legislation our courts are fully empowered to enforce
the provisions of the Convention." CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY REPORTS, 5th Sess. 341
(1953).
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provide effective remedies at the national level to everyone whose
fundamental freedoms are violated. 7
Secondly, each signatory state agreed to become a guardian of
the rights guaranteed by the Convention as against violations by
other member states, and to refer any alleged breach to an interna-
tional body, the European Commission of Human Rights, i8 charged
with preliminary judicial and conciliatory functions. If necessary,
the state would then refer the case to the European Court of Human
Rights for a final adjudication of the dispute.'9 This obligation
vested upon each member state is a real power delegated by the
community of signatory states. It is, therefore, free from the tradi-
tional restrictions of international law which prohibit the inter-
vention of one state into the domestic affairs of another or require,
in the case of state claims on behalf of individuals, a nationality tie
between the party who is victim of the violation and the complaining
state.20
On the self-executing nature of Art. 1, see also Siisterhenn, L'application de la
Convention sur le plan du droit interne, LA PROTECTION INTERNATIONALE DES DROITS
DE L'HOMmE DANS LE CADRE EUROP-EN 303, 305 (1961); Comte, The Application of
the European Convention on Human Rights in Municipal Law, 4 JOURNAL oF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS 94 (1962).
17 Art. 13. "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention
are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding
that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity."
The Rhineland-Palatinate Constitutional Court held that under German law
compliance with this provision did not require the establishing of a right of individual
petition before that tribunal when other channels for relief were open in the ordinary
judiciary and administrative courts. 2 YEARBOOx 598 (1958).
18 Art. 24. "Any High Contracting Party may refer to the Commission . . . any
alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention by another High Contracting
Party."
19 The acceptance of the general jurisdiction of the Commission is obligatory upon
signatory states, but acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court is optional. Eight
states, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the German Federal Republic, Iceland, Ireland,
Luxembourg and The Netherlands have filed declarations recognizing the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court. Hence, pursuant to Art. 48, within three months after filing
of the Commission's report with the Committee of Ministers, the Commission and
petitioner or respondent state may bring the case before the Court. The final decision
as to the existence of a breach of the law of the Convention rests therefore either with
the Committee of Ministers (Art. 32) or with the Court (Art. 50) which are vested
with the duty to provide compensation to the injured party.
20 Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Co. Case (Esthonia v. Lithuania), P.C.I.J. ser.
A/B, No. 76, at 16 (1939); Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) [1955]
I.C.J. Rep. 4. In finding admissible the petition of Austria against Italy in Application
No. 788/60 (see supra note 3) the Commission stated: ". . . it clearly appears from
these pronouncements [the Preamble to the Convention] that the purpose of the
High Contracting Parties in concluding the Convention was not to concede to each
other reciprocal rights and obligations in pursuance of their individual national in-
terests but to realize the aims and ideals of the Council of Europe, as expressed in its
Statute, and to establish a common public order of the free democracies of Europe
with the object of safeguarding their common heritage of political traditions, ideals,
freedom and the rule of law; . . .it follows that the obligations undertaken by the
SANTA CLARA LAWYER [Vol. 4
INDIVIDUAL V. STATE
It is, however, the third protective feature, the recognition of
the right of individual petition, that really opens new horizons to
the world of international law. The Convention established that any
person whose fundamental rights have allegedly been violated by any
of the signatory states may directly petition the European Commis-
sion for relief and through it the European Court of Human Rights.2 '
For the first time in the history of international law, any private
individual, irrespective of nationality ties, was by agreement of
sovereign states, given the right of access to an international body
vested with judicial functions.2
The novelty of the remedy and its outstanding significance are
stressed by the records of the Commission and of the Court. In its
first ten years of life only three petitions were lodged with the Com-
mission by a state against another member state,2 3 while over 2000
High Contracting Parties in the Convention are essentially of an objective character,
being designed rather to protect the fundamental rights of individual human beings
from infringement by any of the . . . Parties than to create subjective and reciprocal
rights for the High Contracting Parties themselves; . . ." 4 YEARBOOK, 138-40 (1961).
21 Art. 25 (1) "The Commission may receive petitions . . . from any person,
nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a
violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in this Con-
vention, provided that the High Contracting Party . . . has declared that it recognises
the competence of the Commission to receive such petitions."
(4) The Commission shall only exercise the powers provided for in this Article
when at least six High Contracting Parties are bound by declarations made in ac-
cordance with the preceding paragraphs."
The optional feature of this novel procedure of individual petition has assured
ratification of the Convention by all members of the Council of Europe except France.
It was the result of pragmatic action on the part of the Committee of Ministers in
amending the original draft Convention submitted to it by the Assembly. See com-
ments by the Irish delegate, Mr. McBride, in CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY REPORTS, 2d
Sess. 282 (1950).
Ten states, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the German Federal Republic, Iceland,
Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden have recognized the right
of individual petition.
22 The Central-American Court of Justice established in 1908 under the Washing-
ton Convention of December 20, 1907, by the states of El Salvador, Costa Rica,
Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala was also accessible to individuals provided, how-
ever, they were nationals of a member state and their petition was not directed against
their own state. That Court in its ten years of life received only five individual peti-
tions and did not find any admissible for trial on the merits. See HUDSON, THE PERMA-
NENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 41, 79 (1936).
23 Two petitions were filed by Greece against the United Kingdom in 1956-57 with
regard to alleged violations of the Convention in Cyprus and were later withdrawn
when the Zurich and London agreements brought about a final settlement in the
Cyprus question. The Pfunders case was filed with the Commission by Austria against
Italy in 1960 as to alleged violations of the Convention in certain criminal proceed-
ings before the Italian courts in South Tyrol.
After extensive hearings at which even the Italian Public Prosecutor was called
to testify, the Commission on May 24, 1963, transmitted its report to the Committee
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petitions were filed by individuals against various member states
alleging a breach of obligations under the Convention. The Court,
which came into existence in 1959, has rendered two decisions, in
1961 and 1962, both on cases of individual petitions.24
A CODE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The authors of the Universal Declaration, well aware of the
fact that they were drafting not an instrument of binding force but
a political manifesto included in it a wide variety of rights of a
personal, social, economic and cultural nature defined in such broad
and noncommittal terms that even states of deeply divergent politi-
cal philosophies could subscribe to them. 5 On the contrary, the
fourteen rights and freedoms guaranteed in the European Conven-
tion2" are the object of specific obligations undertaken by the signa-
tory states, including direct implementation at the national level of
the protection of those rights by their legislative, executive and
judicial departments.27 Before reaching the international level, the
of Ministers; on the basis of that report, on October 23, 1963, the Committee decided
by Resolution No. (63)3DH that no violation of the Convention was found in the
case.
24 Lawless case, decided July 1, 1961, 4 YEARBOOK 430 (1961) ; De Becker case,
decided March 27, 1962, CouNcIL OF EUROPE Docs. A. 69.821.
25 Fifteen years later the signatory states of the Universal Declaration are still
unable to reach an agreement on the specific definition of the rights to be guaranteed.
Thus, the Convention which would bind all states to provide effective protection and
enforcement of those rights is still in the drafting stage. For a complete study of the
United Nations efforts in this direction see Cassin, Reflections on the Rule of Law, 4
JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, 224 (1963). For an excellent
comparison between Declaration and Convention see Pelloux, Pricedents et caractres
gindraux de la Convention Europtenne, in LA PROTECTION INTERNATIONALE DES DROITS
DE L'HOMME 59 (1961).
26 They are set out in Section 1 of the treaty and in Articles 1-3 of the 1952
Protocol which entered into force May 18, 1954. 2 YEARBOOK 92 (1958-59). On the
self-executing nature of Section I of the Convention see Siisterhenn, Die Europaische
Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten, DEUTSCHE VER-
wALTUNCSBLATT, 753 (1955) and Golsong, The European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in a German Court, BRIT. YB. INT'L
L. 317, 319 (1957).
27 Art. 57. "On receipt of a request from the Secretary-General of the Council
of Europe any High Contracting Party shall furnish an explanation of the manner
in which its internal law ensures the effective implementation of any of the provisions
of this Convention."
In the De Becker case, Application No. 214/56, decided by the Commission on
June 9, 1958 (2 YEARBOOK 214) and later referred to the Court for adjudication, the
Commission stated: ". . . in accordance with the general principles of international
law, borne out by the spirit of the Convention as well as by the preliminary works, the
Contracting Parties have undertaken ... to ensure that their domestic legislation is
compatible with the Convention and, if need be, to make any necessary adjustments
to this end, since the Convention is binding on all the authorities of the Contracting
Parties, including the legislative authority"; Id. at 234. See also La Convenzione
Europea dei diritti dell'uomo, COUNCIL OF EUROPE 38 (Strasbourg 1962).
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enforcement of the principles of the Convention is entrusted to the
national courts of each state. Hence, the Convention was conceived
and drafted in the nature of a code of legally binding norms which
define with statutory precision the contents and the breadth of the
freedoms guaranteed. 8
The rights defined in the Convention represent, in fact, the
minimum common denominator of personal rights which each mem-
ber state guarantees within its domestic legal system as the tradi-
tional freedoms of democratic countries. They may be grouped into
six classes :29
1. Right to life and physical integrity, including the outlawing
of torture, inhuman punishment and slavery.80
2. Right to personal liberty and security under civil and crimi-
nal due process principles inherent in a fair administration of justice,
including right to counsel, habeas corpus proceedings, presumption
of innocence, freedom from ex post facto laws and from unlawful
arrest.8 1
3. Right to private and family life which embraces the privacy
of home and correspondence and the freedom to marry and form a
family.82
4. The intellectual freedoms of thought, conscience, religion
and expression, extended to include the right of parents to provide
their children's education according to their religious and phil-
osophical convictions.83
5. The right of peaceful assembly and association, to join trade
unions and to vote in free political elections. 4
28 Two opposite alternatives confronted the drafters of the Convention: one
school of thought advocated a comprehensive enumeration of general principles to be
later implemented by each member state in accordance with its domestic system of
laws and jurisprudence; the other stressed the importance of spelling out in precise
definitions the substance, scope and limit of permissible restrictions of each right and
freedom guaranteed to the individual. It was the second view that prevailed. See
M. Teitgen's comments on Report 77 of the Committee on Legal and Administrative
Questions to the Consultative Assembly on Sept. 4, 1949, CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY
REPORTS, 1154 (1949); The Rights of the European Citizen, COUNCIL oF EUROPE, 22
(Strasbourg 1961); Vasak, supra note 5, at 5; Liebscher, Austria and the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, 4 JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION OF JURISTS 282, 293 (1963).
29 H6raud, Droits garantis par la convention in LA PROTECTION INTERNATIONALE
DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 107 (1961).
80 Arts. 2-4.
81 Arts. 5-7.
82 Arts. 8 and 12.
88 Arts. 9-10 and Art. 2 of Protocol.
84 Art. 11 and Art. 3 of Protocol.
[Vol. 4
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6. The right of property defined as "the peaceful enjoyment
of possessions. '' 35
PERSONAL LIBERTIES AND NATIONAL SECURITY
The delicate task of balancing freedoms with the exigencies of
public interest was met realistically by the drafters of the Conven-
tion through a system of permissible restrictions. Some restrictions
of a general nature represent the necessary counterpart of the rights
reserved to the individuals as they affect public order in a democratic
society. 6
Article 17 specifically forbids such perverted use of the free-
doms guaranteed in the Convention as may be attempted by groups
or persons engaging in activities aimed at destroying those free-
doms. In 1957 the German Communist Party, dissolved by the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court of Germany as unconstitutional under
Article 21 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), filed an application with
the Commission alleging violations of Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the
Convention. The Commission, however, declared the application in-
admissible on the ground that the operation of the Party was within
the purview of Article 17, designed to safeguard the free operation
of democratic institutions by preventing totalitarian groups from
''exploiting in their own interests the principles enunciated by the
Convention."8 7 It added that the traditional objective of the Com-
munist Party was the establishing of a dictatorship of the "prole-
tariat", which implied destruction of many of the rights guaranteed
by the Convention."8
Other limitations are closely connected with the traditional
sovereign rights of states: such is the right of specific reservation to
any provision of the treaty which right a member state may exercise
at the time of signing or of ratifying "to the extent that any law then
in force in its territory is not in conformity with the provision.""9
Thus Norway ratified the Convention with a reservation as to Article
9 (freedom of religion) in that Article 2 of her Constitution, declar-
ing that the Evangelical Lutheran religion is the official religion of
the state, forbade the admission of Jesuits on her territory. However,
85 Art. 1 of Protocol.
36 The lawful exercise of police power justifies the death penalty (Art. 2), forced
labor of prisoners, and compulsory military service (Art. 4). Public order and na-
tional security permit limitations to the publicity of trials (Art. 6), the privacy of
home and correspondence (Art. 8), the exercise of intellectual freedoms (Art. 9) and
of the right of assembly (Art. 11).
87 CONSULTATIVE AssEMBLY REPORTS, 1st Sess. 1235 (1949).
8 Application No. 250/57, 1 YEAmoox 222 (1957).
89 Art. 64. General Reservations are forbidden.
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on November 1, 1956, the constitutional provision was repealed with
specific reference in the repealing statute to the obligation contracted
under the Convention. 40
The most significant among permissible restrictions is the right
of derogation whereby a state in time of war or public emergency
may take measures which temporarily suspend certain freedoms,
serving notice upon the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe
of the measures taken and the reasons therefor.4 The inherent sov-
ereign power to protect public order is thus counterbalanced by a
strict control at the international level on the justifications for apply-
ing the right of derogation.42
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION WITHIN DOMESTIC
JURISDICTIONS
The substantive right of individual petition inserted by the
Convention into the international system of protection of Human
Rights stands as a symbolic landmark at the center of the European
Charter. Nevertheless, ten years of the Commission's practice and
jurisprudence clearly indicate that the real influence and the living
extension of the principles and obligations set forth in the Conven-
tion were meant to be and have been felt primarily at the national
level, within the natural legal habitat of the individual. Structural
and procedural emphasis was placed on events occurring within the
domestic jurisdiction of states. Member states have undertaken to
conform with the principles of the Convention and to provide relief
for violations even in instances where traditionally the "raison
d'Etat" would furnish sufficient justification for the violation.4 3 On
the other hand, individuals are bound to exhaust all local remedies
40 U.N. YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS 169 (1956).
41 Art. 15. No derogation is permitted as to the right to life, and the freedom
from torture, degrading punishment, slavery and the operation of any ex-post facto
law.
42 In the words of the Secretary to the Commission: "A jurisprudence is being
created and ... a consistent attitude of the Commission has emerged in the sense that,
although it concedes to a State a margin of appreciation in applying the provisions of
the Convention which limit the rights or freedoms guaranteed to an individual, the
Commission will jealously examine the justification of any such limitations imposed
by either a legislative or executive measure." McNulty, European Convention on
Human Rights: Relationship Between the Individual and the State, p. 2, Cotmcm OF
EUROPE Docs. A. 73.607 (1963).
See Applications No. 176/56 Greece v. United Kingdom, 2 YEARBOOK 175, 182(1958), No. 214/56 (De Becker v. Belgium), 2 YEARBOOK 214 (1958), No. 322/57
(Lawless v. Ireland), 2 YEARBOOK 308 (1958), No. 493/59, 4 YEARBOOK 302 (1961)
and the first case decided by the European Court, the Lawless case, 4 YEARBOOK 438
(1961). See also Lauterpacht, European Convention on Human Rights: Suspension oj
its application in Cyprus, INT'L & ComP. L.Q., 432 (1956).
43 See note 17 supra, Article 13.
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under the "generally recognized rules of international law" before
their applications may be dealt with by the Commission.44 In addi-
tion, between the findings of admissibility and the conclusions on
violations there is a vast field of the Commission's activity which is
primarily conciliatory, "with a view to securing a friendly settle-
ment of the matter on the basis of respect for Human Rights. 45
Often the persuasive and diplomatic approach of the Commission in
negotiating with states as to alleged violations of individual rights
has produced far greater results than antagonistic procedures or
repressive measures could. In pursuance of this aim, the Conven-
tion has provided that "the Commission shall meet in Camera. ' 46
In the first two interstate petitions filed with the Commission
by Greece against the United Kingdom, the principle of derogation
under Article 15 was in issue and there were allegations of torture
and inhuman treatments in Cyprus. A sub-commission of the
European Commission conducted a field investigation on the island
in January 1958 which resulted in the lifting of certain British puni-
tive restrictions and ultimately brought about the political settle-
ment leading to the full independence of the Republic of Cyprus.
47
In the case of De Becker v. Belgium4" the Commission found
that Article 123 Sexies of the Belgian Criminal Code, which imposed
an inflexible lifetime deprivation of freedom of expression upon per-
sons convicted of treason in time of war, was contrary to Article 10
44 Art. 26. Noncompliance with the requirement to exhaust all domestic legal
remedies has been the most frequent basis of rejection of individual petitions by the
Commission.
45 Art. 28. The complex functions entrusted to the Commission in the processing
of petitions encompass three distinct phases of activities. At the initial stage, when
admissibility of the petition is in issue, the Commission is unquestionably a judicial
body with final decision as to compliance wth jurisdiction (ratione personae, ratione
materiae, ratione temporis, ratione loci), procedure of application and other pre-
requisites set down in the Convention.
Once the petition has been found admissible, the Commission turns to pretrial
duties of an inquisitorial and arbitral nature becoming at once juge d'enqufte and the
arbitrator of international law. Thus it holds hearings, summons witnesses, gathers
facts, hears evidence and above all places its services at disposal of the parties to
reach a settlement of the dispute "on the basis of respect for Human Rights as defined
in this Convention." Art. 28.
In the event no settlement is reached, it is the Commission's duty to act as advisor
and auxiliary to either of the adjudicating bodies, the Court or the Committee of
Ministers. It draws up a report of the facts ascertained and gives its opinion as to
whether or not those facts amount to violation of the duties assumed under the
Convention. If within three months after transmittal of the report, the Commission
decides to transfer the dispute to the Court, it then becomes an assistant to the Court
in the performance of its duties, similar to a magistrat de parquet of civil law systems.
46 Art. 33.
47 Cyprus is now a member of the Convention from which it borrowed the entire
section on human rights of its constitution. See infra note 89.
48 Application No. 214/56, 2 YEARBOOK 214 (1958).
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of the Convention. It then filed its report and referred the case to
the Court, but even before the first hearing of the Court, the respon-
dent state amended its legislation in compliance with the findings.49
Another instance of the far-reaching influence of the Commis-
sion's work has occurred in recent months. A large number of in-
dividual petitions were filed with the Commission by inmates of
Austrian prisons alleging that their rights guaranteed by Article 6
of the Convention had been violated in the course of trial. They
specifically challenged the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure
which made no provision for their representation by counsel at cer-
tain appellate hearings.5" The Commission found some petitions
admissible"oa and rejected others at the preliminary stage. As a result
of Commission conferences and exchange of views with the Austrian
Government, the Austrian Parliament enacted legislation effective in
September 1962 amending section 33 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure to provide equal representation of prosecution and ac-
cused at the appellate level. On March 28, 1963, further legislation
was passed giving all persons convicted under the old code the right
to seek a rehearing within the next six months provided that their
petitions be found admissible by the Commission.5'
THE CONVENTION IN THE NATIONAL COURTS
The necessary limitations of this article prevent us from com-
ing to grips at this time with such complex theoretical questions as
whether and to what extent specific provisions of the Convention
may be considered as self-executing,52 or whether the principle of
supremacy of international law over municipal law transforms the
49 Thus the Court on March 27, 1962, ordered the case stricl~en from the rolls.
See supra note 24.
50 Under the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure (sec. 3) the position of the
state prosecutor is defined as an objective one which demands that he take equally
into account circumstances favorable and unfavorable to the defendant. Secs. 33 and
282-83 of the Code give him the power to file in the defendant's interest objections to
erroneous or harsh judgments and to report thereon to the Chief Prosecutor. Under
this procedure hearings are conducted in the absence of counsel for defense. This
procedure was alleged by petitioners to be in violation of Art. 6 of the Convention
which guarantees the right to a fair hearing and to representation by counsel. See
also Liebscher, supra note 28.
5oa Applications No. 596/59 Pataki v. Austria, 3 YEARBOOK 356 (1960) and
Dunshirn v. Austria, No. 789/60, 4 YEARBOOK 186 (1961) were transmitted to the
Committee of Ministers on May 6, 1963. In October 1963 the Committee decided
that no further action was required in view of the new legislative measures enacted
by Austria. Council of Europe News, 1-2 (November 1963).
51 See McNulty, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, 9 CouNcrx. or
EuRoPE Docs. A. 76.956 (1963). Over 140 applications were filed with the Commission
by Austrian citizens as a result of the passing of this law.
52 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (8th ed. 1955); for an excellent review
of Dualistic and Monistic doctrinal approaches see Comte, supra note 16 at 96-99.
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Convention, upon ratification, into domestic law of the member
states.53 It is possible, however, to cast sufficient light on the subject
of whether or not the Convention is directly enforceable in the
domestic order of each member state through a study of con-
stitutional and legislative provisions, parliamentary debates and
court decisions in point. Thus under current international practice
it appears that, through ratification, the Convention was integrated
into the domestic system of laws of Austria, 4 Belgium,5 the Ger-
man Federal Republic,5 6 Greece,57 Italy58 and the Netherlands5 9
while it did not acquire the force and effect of domestic law in Ire-
land,60 Iceland,6 Luxembourg 62 and the United Kingdom.' The
53 Comte, supra note 16, at 115.
54 There is conflict of opinion as to the rank to be granted the Convention in
Austria but it is unquestionable that it has status at least equal to domestic statutory
law. The Austrian Constitutional Court on June 27, 1960, held that "as a consequence
of its approval by the National Council ... and its publication in the Federal Official
Gazette . . . the Convention became a source of law, inasmuch as it is a provision
equivalent to a Federal Law, and its compulsory force in domestic law . . . is indis-
putable." 3 YEARBOOK 620 (1960).
55 Court of Cassation of Belgium, Sept. 21, 1959, 3 YEARBOOK 625 (1960); Coun-
cil of State decision of March 24, 1961 No. 8050.
56 When the Bundestag consented to ratification of the Convention, it ordered
it published as "having force of law." Act of Aug. 17, 1952, BUNDESOESETZBLATT II 685.
Hence the Miinster Higher Administrative Court in its judgment of Nov. 25, 1955,
held that the Convention has become a part of municipal law, and therefore of di-
rectly enforceable law. 2 YEARBOOK 572, 578 (1958). The Court of Appeal of Bremen
on Feb. 17, 1960, stated specifically: "The Convention has the status of an ordinary
Federal law (den Rang eines einjachen Bundesgesetzes)." 3 YEARBOOK 634 (1960).
57 Decision of the Arios Pagos, Supreme Court of Greece, No. 386/1955 (1955)
Ii-T'L L. REP. 168; 2 YEARBOOK 606 (1958) ; also Council of State decisions of Decem-
ber 5, 1960 and February 8, 1961, Nos. 35/1961, 182/1961.
58 Mr. G. Sperduti, a member of the Commission, in his preface to La Con-
venzione Europea dei diritti dell'uomo, CouNcm oF EUROPE 25 (Strasbourg 1962)
states: "In those States in which the Convention has acquired force of law, as in
Italy (by law of August 4, 1955 No. 848 which authorized ratification and made it
executory) the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Convention enjoy the same
judicial and administrative protection which the domestic order bestows upon the
rights and freedoms it recognizes independently of the international order." (Transla-
tion by the author.)
In the Pfunders case the pleadings of the Italian Government, as incorporated in
the decision of the Commission on the admissibility of the Austrian application,
specificaliy stated that "since the date of ratification by Italy (Oct. 26, 1955) the
Convention constitutes an integral part of the Italian legal system, because Article 2
of the law No. 848 of August 4, 1955 makes it compulsory to observe the Convention
and to cause it to be observed as the law of the land." 4 YEARBOOK 154 (1961).
59 The Netherlands, by virtue of a constitutional amendment of 1956, placed all
treaties above municipal law, including even constitutional law and laws of a later
date. See decision of the Court of Arnheim (March 8, 1961) and of the Supreme
Court (Jan. 19, 1962) 4 YEARBOOK 630-650 (1961).
60 Art. 29 (6) of the Constitution of Ireland provides "No international agree-
ment shall be part of the domestic law of the State save as may be determined by the
Oireachtas (the Parliament)." In the Lawless case habeas corpus proceedings brought
under the law of the Convention before the Supreme Court of Ireland were dismissed
in 1957 on the ground that the Irish Parliament (Oireachtas) had not determined
that the Convention was part of the domestic law. The Court accordingly cannot
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remaining countries, Cyprus, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Tur-
key are still uncommitted as to constitutional or statutory provisions
or judicial interpretation on this question. 64
The availability of a remedy before national courts under the
provisions of the Convention remains the most striking and effective
feature of its implementation at the domestic level. The courts of
member states have been confronted with individual challenges to
existing legislation as contrary to the principles of the Rome treaty. 5
Even where no violation was found, the law of the Convention has
thus become a living reality, beaming to all persons its message of a
common legal standard in human rights for the Western World.
PROTECTION OF FAMILY LIFE
The right to respect for private and family life guaranteed by
Article 8 of the Convention came in issue before the Federal Ad-
ministrative Court of Germany in 1956 as opposed to State power
to expel undesirable aliens.66 A Belgian citizen, former prisoner of
war, was appealing an order of expulsion from Germany imposed
upon him under a 1938 ordinance for conviction of a crime com-
mitted in that country. After conviction he had married a German
citizen, the mother of two illegitimate children, who later bore him
a child. Since the illegitimate children were German nationals and
as such would not be readily accepted for admission by a foreign
country, the high Court found that the order of expulsion would have
forced the wife to choose between parting from her husband or from
her children, contrary to the individual rights guaranteed by Article
8 of the Convention. It thus annulled the order of expulsion. 7
accept the idea that the primacy of domestic legislation is displaced by the State be-
coming a party to the Convention. 2 YEARBOOK 608 (1958).
61 See decision of the Town Court of Reykjavik cited supra note 10.
62 In its decision of October 24, 1960, the Luxembourg Court of Summary Juris-
diction stated: ". . . It appears . . . that the rights and principles described in the
Convention may not, under the terms of the Convention, be appealed against orinvoked directly before national courts but may only be the subject of international
appeals as laid down and stipulated in the Convention." 4 YEARBOOK 628-30 (1961).
63 The traditional position of the British Government is that only the govern-
ment should decide how to fulfill its international obligations; and that only by
enactment of a bill may an international agreement be transformed into a rule of
domestic law. See debates in the House of Commons on Nov. 26, 1958, and June 25,
1959, as to the optional right of individual petition. 2 YEARBOOK 546 (1958), 3 Id. 598
(1960).
64 As to Norway see infra note 86.
65 For the interpretation of the provisions of the Convention under municipal
law see Comte, supra note 16, at 121.
66 Deutsche Verwaltungsblatt 57 (1957); 2 YEARBOOK 584 (1958). This decision
was followed by the Higher Administrative Court of Minster on November 21, 1958,
II, A. 1439/57 and on August 2, 1960, 4 YEARBOOK 618 (1961).
67 The opposite conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court of Belgium in
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FREEDOM OF WORSHIP
The requirement that construction and use of buildings for
religious worship of all denominations be subject to authorization
by the civil authorities under penalty of fine was found by the
Supreme Court of Greece not to be contrary to freedom of religion
in that it was required in public interest for the protection of health
and safety of the citizens.68
The Court of Cassation of the Netherlands69 held that the im-
posing of a general, compulsory old age insurance law requiring
church ministers to pay contributions did not encroach upon freedom
of religion as protected by Article 9 of the Convention. Commenting
on this point the Court stated:
Thus the obligation to pay contribution which in principle falls upon
all, independent of religious belief, does not in any way affect the in-
dividual's right to freedom of thought, conscience or worship.
... the freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs herein guaran-
teed is not the same thing as freedom to oppose one's own religious
ideas or beliefs to the provisions of the law, and . . . therefore, the
provision of the Convention under which the appeal is lodged does not
mean that anyone may be free to evade the enforcement of laws even
when they have nothing to do with the manifestation of religion or
beliefs by alleging the nullity or irrelevance of such laws because of
religious ideas or beliefs that do not accord with them .... 70
On January 19, 1962, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands
71
upheld the law of September 10, 1853, which made it unlawful to
hold religious services in public places outside of buildings dedicated
to religious worship thus reversing the decision of the Court of Ap-
peals of Arnheim.72 The latter had ruled that the limitations of the
right to publicly manifest one's religious beliefs guaranteed by
Article 9 of the Convention were only those necessary for public
safety and order in a democratic society but did not apply in modern
times to the holding of a religious procession hardly to be regarded
as prejudicial to public health or morals. The Claims Commission
of the National Employment Office of Brussels in its decision of
1959 as to a German woman married to a Belgian who, after being expelled, had
illegally re-entered Belgium to join her husband. The reason of "ordre publique"
necessary in a democratic society was given as overruling the individual right to
respect for family life. JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 573 (1960), 3 YEARBOOK 624 (1960).
68 [1955] INT'L L. REP. 168; 2 YEARBOOx 606 (1958).
69 Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 993 (1960) ; 3 YEARBoox 648 (1960).
70 3 YEARBOOK 658, 668-70 (1960).
71 4 YEARBOOK 640 (1961).
72 4 YEARBooK 630 (1961).
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March 13, 1962,"a declared admissible the petition of an orthodox
Jew who claimed exemption from being compelled to attend a strik-
ers control assembly on Saturdays on the ground that his freedom of
religion was guaranteed by the Constitution and by Article 9 of the
Convention.
DuE PROCESS
The German courts have developed a substantial jurisprudence
on the application of Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention. Failure to
pronounce public judgment, when a Military Government ordinance
did not so require was found by the Miinster Higher Administrative
Court not to be in violation of Article 6 of the Convention.74 The
same conclusion was reached by the Federal Court of Justice in
1957 as to written proceedings before an Appellate Court where
notice to the parties replaced public pronouncement of judgment
under provision of the German Code of Criminal Procedure.75
Preventive detention pending trial or appeal may take on con-
notations of penal imprisonment when there is a case of denial of
application for conditional release. The Federal Constitutional
Court of Germany held, however, that it is within the jurisdiction
of ordinary courts to determine whether or not the duration of de-
tention, to be inferred from the nature of the charges, is in propor-
tion to the penalty which was imposed later. An appeal could not be
taken to the Constitutional Court on this issue, on the ground of
violation of the Convention."0 The Court of Appeals of Bremen on
February 17, 1960, held that Article 5 of the European Convention,
which has the status of ordinary Federal law, does not preclude
keeping an accused under arrest, provided he is brought to trial
within a reasonable time or released pending trial.7 7 "Reasonable
time" being a question of fact, the Court found no violation of the
Convention in the case of an accused with previous convictions who
had escaped into the Soviet zone, was arrested on his return to
78 JOURNAL DES TRmUNAUX 267 (1962).
74 Judgment of November 25, 1955, NEUE JURISTISCHE WocHENscu mr 1374
(1956); 2 YEARBOOK 572 (1958). "The fact that the Convention is part of municipal
law does not mean that the obligation to pronounce judgment publicly, in accordance
with Art. 6, applies to administrative courts; that clause refers only to the deter-
mination by a tribunal of 'civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge . .
not administrative courts which determine disputes of public law." Id. at 580.
75 NEuE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1480 (1957); 2 YEARBooK 596 (1958). A
similar ruling was given by the European Commission on July 7, 1959, as to Applica-
tion No. 423/58 on the interpretation of Art. 6. See also Velu Le problame de Pap-
plication aux jurisdictions administratives des r~gles de la Convention Europdenne des
droits de l'homme, REVUE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL ET COMPARA (Brussels) 129 (1961).
70 Decision of January 14, 1960, 3 YEARBOOX 628 (1960).
77 3 Id. 636 (1960).
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Berlin and placed in preventive detention for a period not exceeding
the limits of the maximum penalty that could be imposed upon him
at trial.
The Constitutional Court of Austria in two instances, on June
27, 1960,78 and on October 14, 1961,'7 held that restrictions of liberty
without an arrest warrant in the course of administrative action un-
der the Criminal Finance Laws were not contrary to Article 6 of
the Convention in that the latter was not self-executing but con-
tained only principles requiring further interpretation by the na-
tional Legislature. The Court stated in the first instance:
As a consequence of its approval (Genehmigung) by the National
Council . . . and its publication in the Federal Official Gazette .. . the
Convention became a source of law, inasmuch as it is a provision equiv-
alent to a Federal Law, and its compulsive force in domestic law .. . is
indisputable.
* . . The Convention and its Protocol require the Austrian legislature
to adapt municipal law to the provisions of the Convention insofar as
it does not already conform thereto and insofar as it does not already
guarantee rights more far-reaching than those protected by the Con-
vention or Protocol ....
. . . Article 6 contains only principles constituting a programme,
which must undoubtedly be put into effect and respected by the legisla-
tor, but which do not in themselves constitute an immediately ap-
plicable body of law. The validity of Austrian law has not been altered
by the mere publication of the Convention in the Federal Official
Gazette.8 0
While the Constitutional Court of Austria had found that the
Austrian reservation to Article 5 of the Convention applied only to
measures restrictive of liberty provided by laws of administrative
procedure, excluding therefore the Criminal Finance laws, the Euro-
pean Commission8' held that the Austrian reservation applied to all
laws in force at the time of ratification concerning administrative
questions which give administrative authorities the power to impose
penalties of imprisonment for violations.
FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE AND PROFESSION
The right to a free choice of residence within the national territory
was held by the Greek Council of State to be subject to public se-
78 3 Id. 616 (1960).
79 4 Id. 604 (1961).
80 3 Id. 620-622 (1960).
81 Application No. 1047/61, 4 YEARBOOK 356 (1961).
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curity measures without violation of Article 5 of the Convention. 2
In two later decrees83 the same Court found that relocation measures
were not among the cases specified in that article as permissible
limitations of individual freedoms but justified them as application
of the right of derogation permitted by Article 15. However, no
evidence has been found of any notice of derogation by Greece under
Article 15.
As to the right of residence on territory subject to a foreign
jurisdiction, the Miinster Higher Administrative Court found that
such right was not protected by the Convention. 4
On September 27, 1960, the Administrative Court of Appeal of
Berlin ruled that a deportation order against an Eastern European
refugee repeatedly convicted of crimes in Germany was not inhuman
treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, although the de-
portee claimed that if deported to his native Czechoslovakia he
would be sentenced to death for espionage or desertion. 5 On Decem-
ber 16, 1961, the Supreme Court of Norway rejected the appeal of a
dentist, Dr. Iversen, sentenced to pay a fine for refusing to practice
his profession for one year in the northern section of the State as
ordered by the Secretary of Social Affairs pursuant to a 1958 Statute
on Civil service for dentists. The appellant had claimed that the
Secretary's decision was in violation of Article 4 of the Convention
which prohibits forced and compulsory labor. The Supreme Court
found that the complaint was without legal foundation, impliedly
applying the law of the Convention.'
MESSAGE TO THE FREE WORLD
The African and Asian nations which have recently gained
their independence or are preparing to do so are still hesitantly fac-
ing the many ways of life open before them. To these nations the
problem of establishing the position of the individual vis-d-vis society
and state is very real and immediate. A number of these countries
82 [1955] INT'L L. REP. 168.
83 Decrees No. 35/1961 of December 5, 1960, and No. 182/1961 of February 1,
1961.
84 [1954] INT'IL L. REP. 209.
85 3 YEARBOOK 640 (1960).
86 Dr. Iversen later filed application for relief with the European Commission,
which has his case under study. See McNulty, The Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights, COUNCIL OF EUROPE Docs. A. 76.956 p. 5 (1963). Under the Norwegian
legal system a treaty creates obligations and rights only as to states with effects
limited to the international legal order. However, by means of national legislation a
treaty may be accepted and incorporated into the domestic system of law. Norway
has not enacted any such law as to the Convention.
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searched the Law of Nations for a pattern and found the new formu-
lation of the rights of free peoples and a system of effective protec-
tion in the language and practice of the European Convention.
On May 23, 1960, Mr. Kershaw in the House of Commons,
called the attention of the British Government to the fact that Dr.
Hastings Banda, the leader of Nyasaland's independence move-
ment, had entered into negotiations with the Icelandic Government.
Dr. Banda attempted to persuade Iceland to file with the European
Commission on Human Rights a petition against the United King-
dom alleging that his imprisonment was in violation of the law of
the Convention as applied to overseas dependent territories of the
United Kingdom.87 It appears that Dr. Banda's delegate, Mr. Kan-
gama Chiume found very favorable and sympathetic reception on
the part of the Icelandic Secretary of State. The Government there-
after initiated steps to enroll the support of the other Scandinavian
countries, but before any formal action could be taken with the
Commission, Dr. Banda was released.88 Whatever may be the im-
plications of those events, it is beyond question that a number of
newly emerging nations have received the message of the Conven-
tion and have followed its guidelines in their systems of law.
The Republic of Cyprus, which became independent in 1960,
has incorporated into its Constitution almost verbatim Articles 2-14
of the Convention and Article 1 of the Protocol.89
The Commission created by the British Government in 1958
to study the problems of national, racial and religious minorities
in Nigeria, proposed to incorporate Articles 2-14 of the European
Convention into the draft Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria.
These articles now constitute the entire Sixth Schedule of the Ni-
gerian Constitution under the title "Fundamental Rights."9 Already
the High Court of Kano, Nigeria, has been called upon to decide on
December 15, 1959, whether certain sections of the 1958 Law on
Children and Young Persons, forbidding political activities of
juveniles, were void as in conflict with the human rights provisions
87 House of Commons, Weekly Hansard, May 23, 1960, Col. 173.
88 VASAK, DE LA CONVENTION EUROPkENNE A LA CONVENTION AFRICAINE DES
DRoITs DE L'HOMME 64 (1962) quoting the Guardian, February 19, 1960; News
Chronicle, February 22, 1960; N.Y. Herald Tribune April 2, 1960.
89 For the text of Acts. 6-23 of the Constitution of Cyprus see 3 YEARBOOK 678
(1960).
90 For the text of the Constitution of Nigeria see Id. at 706. For further details
as to the African legislative developments see Elias, The New Protection of Human
Rights, 2 JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS 30 (1959); Mo-
dinos, Les enseignments de la Convention in LA PROTECTION INTERNATIONALE DES
DROITS DE L'HoMME 343 (1960); McNulty, Influences directes exercies hors d'Europe
par la Convention Europ~enne, Id. at 377.
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of the Constitution. It found that they were not.9 ' Kenya,92 Sierra
Leone, 93 Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Uganda thereafter pat-
terned their Constitutional provisions on human rights on the
Nigerian Constitution.9 4
When the Belgian Congo was approaching the time of its in-
dependence, its Minister submitted to the Belgian senate a bill on
fundamental freedoms with sustaining comments referring particu-
larly to the Universal Declaration and to the European Convention.
This bill was enacted on June 17, 1960, and under the Constitution
of Congo became Congolese Law as of the date of its independence,
July 1, 1960.9r
The regional solution proposed in the European Convention for
the protection of human rights, an intermediate step between the
limitations of domestic jurisdiction and the unsurmountable bar-
riers of theoretical conflicts at the world level, is now offering in-
spiration to the African jurists who, looking beyond their national
borders, are attempting to place the problems of the protection of
fundamental freedoms on the international level. The 194 jurists,
from twenty-three African and nine other countries, who convened
at Lagos, Nigeria, in January 1961 to attend the first Congress of
African Jurists, proposed there the drafting of an African Conven-
tion on Human Rights which, like the European Convention, would
specifically provide for the creation of a special Court and of forms
of relief open to all persons under the jurisdiction of the signatory
States. 6 At the conferences of African Chiefs of State, which met at
Monrovia in May 1961 and at Addis Ababa in May 1963, the project
of an African Convention on Human Rights patterned on the Euro-
pean Convention was again discussed. 7 The importance of approv-
91 3 YEARBOOK 724 (1960). See also decisions of the Supreme Federal Court of
April 6, 1961, and October 27, 1961.
92 Came into force on December 7, 1960.
93 Came into force on April 27, 1961.
94 4 YEARBOOK 656 (1961). See also VASAK, supra note 88, at 73-74.
95 McNulty, supra note 90, at 383.
96 The Law of Lagos, African Congress on the Rule of Law, INTERNATIONAL
CoMMIssIoN OF JURISTS 9 (Geneva 1961).
The jurist from Togo, Mr. M. F. Amorin submitted to the Congress a draft resolu-
tion on a Convention on Human Rights in the following terms: "The commission,
taking into consideration the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and...
particularly the European Convention of 1950 and the draft Inter-American Con-
vention,... recommends that this Congress invite the African Governments to study
the possibility of adopting an African Convention of Human Rights providing specific-
ally for the creation of a proper judicial body accessible to all individuals who are
victims of a violation of their rights." Id. at 112.
97 See address by Mr. P. Pflimlin, President of the Consultative Assembly of
the Council of Europe at the September 1963, Ceremonial Sitting in Strasbourg com-
memorating the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention, COUNCIL
OF EUROPE Docs. A. 83.247 . 19.
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ing an African Convention on Human Rights was also stressed by
Dr. Nnamdi Azi Kiwe, the Governor General of Nigeria, in his speech
on the future of Pan-Africanism delivered in London on August 12,
1961.98
On the American continent the European Convention has also
projected its message. In August 1959 the Consultative Conference
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American
States at its 5th meeting in Santiago, Chile, undertook the drafting
of an Inter-American Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights. This Convention incorporates, like its European blueprint,
a system of guarantees in the form of an Inter-American Commis-
sion and Court of Human Rights.9" Thus the Council of the Organi-
zation on May 25, 1960, approved the Statute of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights.'00
CONCLUSION
The European Bill of Rights, which issued of a common heritage
largely but not exclusively European in its origin, is truly the ideo-
logical cornerstone of a modern united Europe, erected in self-de-
fense against all open or disguised attempts to make the welfare of
the individual subservient to that of the state. It has established by
treaty a real and effective control system whereby for the first time
in the history of international law human rights and fundamental
freedoms are internationally guaranteed in one part of the world.
In its varied and rich practice the Commission is actively de-
veloping from the nucleus of the Convention new principles of juris-
prudence on individual rights and duties in international law. The
European Court of Human Rights, at the center of the structure
of the Convention, may well become the model for an International
Court of Human Rights, which jurists of our time find long over-
due.'0 ' From the viewpoint of its immediate and direct applicability
to individuals, the system works and can serve as a pattern for new
and richer experiences toward the recognition of the private in-
dividual in international law.
98 4 YEARBOOK 656, note 5 (1961).
99 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights-Basic Documents, PAN AMER-
ICAN UNION OEA/ser. L/V/I. 4 p. 28 (1960).
100 Id. at 9.
101 Supreme Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg in a recent address at the Jewish
Theological Seminary strongly advocated the establishing of an International Court
of Human Rights on the successful example of the European Court. N.Y. Times,
November 18, 1963, p. 26.
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